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Abstract
Three well-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf
value and the equal division solution. In the literature various axiomatizations of these
solutions can be found. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value often use efficiency which
is not satisﬁed by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisﬁes
collusion neutrality which is not satisﬁed by the Shapley value. Both properties seem
desirable. However, neither the Shapley value nor the Banzhaf value satisfy both. The
equal division solution does satisfy both axioms and, moreover, together with symmetry
these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no
solution that satisﬁes eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally,
we show that a solution satisﬁes eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and linearity if and only if
there exist exogenous weights for the players such that in any game the worth of the ‘grand
coalition’ is distributed proportional to these weights.
Keywords: Eﬃciency, Collusion neutrality, Shapley value, Banzhaf value, Equal division
solution, Impossibility.
JEL code: C71
1 Introduction
A situation in which a ﬁnite set N = {1, . . . , n} of n players can generate certain payoﬀs by
cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a
TU-game), being a pair (N, v) where v: 2N → IR is a characteristic function on N satisfying
v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e. the members of
coalition S can obtain a total payoﬀ of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate.
A payoff vector x ∈ IRN of an n-player TU-game (N, v) is an n-dimensional vector
giving a payoﬀ xi ∈ IR to any player i ∈ N . A (single-valued) solution for TU-games
is a function that assigns a payoﬀ vector to every TU-game (N, v). Three well-known
solutions for TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division
solution. In the literature various axiomatizations of these solutions can be found. Most
axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value use eﬃciency. For example, the original
characterization of the Shapley value characterizes it by eﬃciency, linearity, symmetry and
the null player property, see Shapley (1953). Various characterizations of the Banzhaf
value use some collusion neutrality axiom, see for example, Lehrer (1988), Haller (1994)
and Malawski (2002) who characterize the Banzhaf value by linearity, symmetry, the null
player property, the inessential game property and some collusion neutrality property.
Collusion neutrality properties state that the sum of payoﬀs of two players does not change
if these two players in some way ‘collude’ and act as one player. Both eﬃciency and
collusion neutrality seem to be desirable properties. Clearly, by the above mentioned
characterizations of the Shapley value and Banzhaf value, there does not exist a solution
satisfying eﬃciency, collusion neutrality, linearity, symmetry and the null player property.
A solution that does satisfy both eﬃciency and collusion neutrality is the equal division
solution. In fact, we show that together with symmetry these axioms characterize the
equal division solution if there are at least three players. Since the equal division solution
does not satisfy the null player property, the next question is whether there is a solution
that satisﬁes eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. It turns out that
such a solution does not exist for games with at least three players. Finally, we show
that a solution satisﬁes eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and linearity if and only if there
exist exogenous weights for the players such that in any game the worth of the ‘grand
coalition’ is distributed proportional to these weights. Note that this implies that together
with symmetry these axioms characterize the equal division solution but, as argued above,
these axioms are not logically independent because we do not need linearity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some preliminaries on TU-games.
In Section 3 we show that there is a unique solution satisfying eﬃciency, collusion neutrality
and symmetry, which is the equal division solution. In Section 4 we show that there is no
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solution satisfying eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. In Section
5 we characterize a class of proportional solutions by eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and
linearity. Finally, in Section 6 we make some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we take the set of players N = {1, . . . , n} to be ﬁxed, and therefore denote a
TU-game (N, v) just by its characteristic function v. We assume that the game has at least
three players2. The collection of all characteristic functions (which we will thus refer to as
games) on N is denoted by GN . The increase in worth when player i ∈ N joins coalition
S ⊆ N \ {i} is called the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S in game v ∈ GN
and is denoted by
mSi (v) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
Assuming that the ‘grand coalition’ N forms in a way such that the players enter the coali-
tion one by one, the Shapley value assigns to every player its expected marginal contribution
to the coalition of players that enter before him given that all orders of entrance have equal
probability. Thus, the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is the solution Sh:GN → IRN given
by
Shi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
(n− |S| − 1)!(|S|)!
n!
mSi (v) for all i ∈ N.
On the other hand, the Banzhaf value (introduced by Banzhaf (1965) to measure voting
power in voting games and generalized by Owen (1975) and Dubey and Shapley (1979)
to general TU-games) is the solution Ba:GN → IRN that assigns to every player its ex-
pected marginal contribution given that every combination of the other players has equal
probability of being the coalition that is already present when that player enters. Thus, it
assigns to every player in a game its average marginal contribution, i.e.
Bai(v) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N\{i}
mSi (v) for all i ∈ N.
Players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in game v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Player i ∈ N is a null player in game v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N \ {i}. For
v,w ∈ GN , the game (v + w) ∈ GN is deﬁned by (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S) for all S ⊆ N .
For v ∈ GN and α ∈ IR, the game αv ∈ GN is deﬁned by (αv)(S) = αv(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Haller (1994) introduces some collusion neutrality properties which state that the sum
2We make some remarks on two-player games in the final section.
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of payoﬀs of two players does not change if they ‘collude’. He used these properties to
axiomatize the Banzhaf value. Later, Malawski (2002) showed that several other collusion
neutrality properties can be used. In this paper we consider collusion between two players
where they agree to ‘act as one’ in the sense that they contribute to a coalition only when
they both are present. So, when players i, j ∈ N , i = j, collude in game v ∈ GN , then
instead of game v we consider the game vij ∈ GN given by
vij(S) =
{
v(S \ {i, j}) if {i, j} ⊆ S
v(S) if {i, j} ⊆ S.
(2.1)
Finally, a game v is called inessential if v(S) =
∑
i∈S v({i}) for all S ⊆ N , i.e. for every
player its marginal contribution to any coalition is the same. Various axiomatizations of the
Shapley value and the Banzhaf value have been given in the literature. Some axioms that
are used in these axiomatic characterizations are the following. A solution f :GN → IRN
satisﬁes
• efficiency if
∑
i∈N fi(v) = v(N) for all v ∈ G
N ;
• linearity if f(αv + βw) = αf(v) + βf(w) for all v, w ∈ GN and α, β ∈ IR;
• symmetry if fi(v) = fj(v) whenever i and j are symmetric players in v ∈ GN ;
• the null player property if fi(v) = 0 whenever i is a null player in v ∈ GN ;
• the inessential game property if fi(v) = v({i}) for all i ∈ N and inessential games v;
• collusion neutrality if fi(vij) + fj(vij) = fi(v) + fj(v) for all i, j ∈ N and v ∈ G
N ,
with vij given by (2.1).
Most axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value use eﬃciency. For example, the
original characterization in Shapley (1953) characterizes it by eﬃciency, linearity, symmetry
and the null player property3. The Banzhaf value satisﬁes linearity, symmetry and the null
player property, but it is not eﬃcient. Malawski (2002) characterized the Banzhaf value by
linearity, symmetry, the null player property, the inessential game property and collusion
neutrality4.
3This axiomatization is more often presented in this way although Shapley (1953) combines efficiency
and the null player property into a carrier axiom.
4As mentioned, other collusion neutrality properties that are used to axiomatize the Banzhaf value are
stated in Haller (1994). The results in this paper also can be stated in terms of those neutrality properties.
An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value with collusion properties in terms of inequalities can be found in
Lehrer (1988).
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In van den Brink (2007) it is shown that in several axiomatizations of the Shapley value,
replacing an axiom about null players (such as the null player property) by a similar axiom
about nullifying players (being players whose presence in a coalition implies that the worth
of the coalition is zero) yields axiomatic characterizations of the equal division solution
ED:GN → IRN which is given by
EDi(v) =
v(N)
n
for all i ∈ N.
In this paper we ﬁnd another axiomatization of the equal division solution by combining
axioms that characterize the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value. The proof of this
axiomatization uses the unanimity basis for TU-games. The unanimity game of coalition
T ⊆ N , T = ∅, is the game uT ∈ GN given by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0
otherwise. It is well-known that the set of unanimity games form a basis of GN : every game
v ∈ GN can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games v =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
∆v(T )uT
with ∆v(T ) =
∑
S⊆T (−1)
|T |−|S|v(S) being the Harsanyi dividends, see Harsanyi (1959).
3 Dropping the null player property: an axiomatiza-
tion of the equal division solution
Both eﬃciency and collusion neutrality seem to be desirable properties. Clearly, by axiom-
atizations of the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value mentioned before, there does not
exist a solution satisfying eﬃciency, collusion neutrality, linearity, symmetry and the null
player property. It turns out that for games with at least three players, dropping the null
player property yields a characterization of the equal division solution. We can even state
a stronger characterization result without linearity.
Theorem 1 A solution f :GN → IRN satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and symme-
try if and only if it is the equal division solution.
Proof
It is easy to verify that the equal division solution satisﬁes the three properties. To show
uniqueness, we proceed by induction on the smallest cardinality of the coalitions with non-
zero dividend in a game. Before starting to show uniqueness, we introduce the following
notation. For any game v ∈ GN , deﬁne H(v) = {T ⊆ N | ∆v(T ) = 0} as the set
of coalitions with non-zero dividend, d(v) = minT∈H(v) |T | as the smallest cardinality of
coalitions with non-zero dividend, and h(v) = |{T ∈ H(v) | d(v) = |T |}| as the number of
coalitions of smallest cardinality with non-zero dividend.
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Next we start the proof of uniqueness. Consider game v ∈ GN . First, if d(v) = |N | then
v is a scaled unanimity game of the ‘grand coalition’, i.e. v = ∆v(N)uN with ∆v(N) = 0.
(Note that in this case ∆v(N) = v(N).) Symmetry implies that all players earn the same
payoﬀ. Eﬃciency then determines that fi(v) =
∆v(N)
n
= v(N)
n
= EDi(v) for all i ∈ N .
Proceeding by induction, assume that f(v′) is uniquely determined for all v′ ∈ GN with
d(v′) > d(v).
In order to use collusion neutrality, we use the following result from Malawski (2002)
concerning collusion between two players in unanimity games. For every coalition R ⊆ N
and two players i, j ∈ N , i = j, it holds that
(uR)ij =
{
uR if either [i, j ∈ R] or [i, j ∈ N \R]
uR∪{i,j} otherwise.
(3.2)
We now start induction on h(v). First, assume that h(v) = 1. Then there is a unique
T ∈ H(v) with |T | = d(v), i.e. T is the (unique) smallest cardinality coalition with
non-zero dividend. Take a speciﬁc j ∈ T and h ∈ N \ T . Collusion neutrality implies that
fi(v) + fj(v) = fi(vij) + fj(vij) for all i ∈ N \ T, (3.3)
and
fh(v) + fg(v) = fh(vhg) + fg(vhg) for all g ∈ T \ {j}, (3.4)
while eﬃciency requires that∑
i∈N
fi(v) = v(N). (3.5)
By (3.2) it follows that
(i) (uT )ij = uT∪{i} for all i ∈ N \ T ,
(ii) (uR)ij is either equal to uR or uR∪{i,j} for every R ⊆ N and i ∈ N \ T ,
(iii) (uT )hg = uT∪{h} for all g ∈ T \ {j}, and
(iv) (uR)hg is either equal to uR or uR∪{h,g} for every R ⊆ N and g ∈ T \ {j}.
Therefore, d(vij) > d(v) for all i ∈ N \ T , and d(vhg) > d(v) for all g ∈ T \ {j}, and thus
by the induction hypothesis, the equations (3.3) and (3.4) become
fi(v) + fj(v) = EDi(vij) + EDj(vij) =
2vij(N)
n
=
2v(N)
n
for all i ∈ N \ T, (3.6)
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and
fh(v) + fg(v) = EDh(vhg) + EDg(vhg) =
2vhg(N)
n
=
2v(N)
n
for all g ∈ T \ {j}. (3.7)
Since the 1 + (n − |T |) + (|T | − 1) = n equations given by (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) are
linearly independent5, the values fi(v), i ∈ N , are uniquely determined and given by
fi(v) =
v(N)
n
= EDi(v).
Next, proceeding by induction on h(v), assume that the result holds for every v′ ∈ GN
with d(v′) ≥ d(v) and h(v′) < h(v). Similar as above, take a T ∈ H(v) with |T | = d(v).
(Note that now there are h(v) > 1 of such coalitions.) Collusion neutrality, the induction
hypothesis and eﬃciency yield the same equations (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7), and it can be
similarly shown that f(v) is uniquely determined by f(v) = ED(v) whenever H(v) = ∅.
Finally, we have to consider game v ∈ GN with H(v) = ∅. Then, v is the null game, i.e.
v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N . Symmetry implies that all players earn the same payoﬀ. With
eﬃciency it then follows that fi(v) = 0 = EDi(v) for all i ∈ N . 
Logical independence of the axioms of Theorem 1 is shown by the following solutions.
1. The Shapley value satisﬁes eﬃciency and symmetry. It does not satisfy collusion
neutrality.
2. The Banzhaf value satisﬁes collusion neutrality and symmetry. It does not satisfy
eﬃciency.
3. The solution f :GN → IRN that assigns all payoﬀ to player 1, i.e. f 1(v) = v(N) and
f i(v) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {1}, satisﬁes eﬃciency and collusion neutrality. It does not
satisfy symmetry.
4 Dropping symmetry: an impossibility
In the previous section we saw that dropping the null player property from our set of
desirable properties yields an axiomatization of the equal division solution. The next
question is what happens if we drop symmetry instead of the null player property. It turns
out that there is no solution satisfying eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and the null player
property. Note that for this impossibility result we do not need linearity.
Theorem 2 There is no solution on GN satisfying efficiency, collusion neutrality and the
null player property.
5This follows from some easy but tedious computations.
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Proof
By contradiction, suppose that solution f :GN → IRN satisﬁes eﬃciency, collusion neutrality
and the null player property.
Consider unanimity games uT , ∅ = T ⊆ N . The null player property implies that
fk(uT ) = 0 for all k ∈ N \ T, (4.8)
and with eﬃciency it then follows that∑
k∈T
fk(uT ) = 1. (4.9)
Thus, if |T | = 1, i.e. T = {i} for some i ∈ N , then the null player property and eﬃciency
determine the payoﬀs fj(uT ) = 0 for j ∈ N \ {i} and fi(uT ) = 1.
If |T | = 2, i.e. T = {i, j} for some i, j ∈ N with i = j, then the null player property and
eﬃcieny imply that fh(uT ) = 0 for h ∈ N \ {i, j}, and fi(uT ) + fj(uT ) = 1. (Note that the
same is implied by collusion neutrality and the case |T | = 1 considered above.)
Next consider the case |T | = 3, i.e. T = {i, j, h} with i, j and h being three diﬀerent
players. (Recall that we only consider classes of games with at least three players.) By
(4.9) we have that fi(uT ) + fj(uT ) + fh(uT ) = 1. In order to apply collusion neutrality,
notice that
(
u{i,j}
)
hi
=
(
u{i,j}
)
hj
=
(
u{i,h}
)
ji
=
(
u{i,h}
)
jh
=
(
u{j,h}
)
ij
=
(
u{j,h}
)
ih
= uT .
Then, collusion neutrality implies that
fi(uT ) + fj(uT ) = fi(u{i,h}) + fj(u{i,h}) = fi(u{j,h}) + fj(u{j,h}) (4.10)
fi(uT ) + fh(uT ) = fi(u{i,j}) + fh(u{i,j}) = fi(u{j,h}) + fh(u{j,h}) (4.11)
and
fj(uT ) + fh(uT ) = fj(u{i,j}) + fh(u{i,j}) = fj(u{i,h}) + fh(u{i,h}). (4.12)
By (4.8) we have that this system of equations can be reduced to
fi(uT ) + fj(uT ) = fi(u{i,h}) = fj(u{j,h}) (4.13)
fi(uT ) + fh(uT ) = fi(u{i,j}) = fh(u{j,h}) (4.14)
and
fj(uT ) + fh(uT ) = fj(u{i,j}) = fh(u{i,h}). (4.15)
It follows that fi(uT ) + fj(uT ) = fi(u{i,h}) = 1 − fh(u{i,h}) = 1 − fj(uT ) − fh(uT ), where
the ﬁrst equality follows from (4.13), the second equality follows from (4.9) and the third
equality follows from (4.15). By (4.9) we then have that fj(uT ) = 0.
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Similar we can derive from the other equations that fi(uT ) = fh(uT ) = 0, which contradicts
eﬃciency. So, there does not exist a solution satisfying eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and
the null player property6. 
5 Dropping the null player property and symmetry: a
characterization of a class of proportional solutions
From the original axiomatization of the Shapley value given by Shapley (1953) combined
with collusion neutrality, we might still consider what solutions are left if we drop both the
null player property and symmetry. It turns out that in that case we are left with a class of
proportional solutions for which there exist exogenous weights for the players such that in
any game the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ is distributed proportional to these weights7.
Deﬁne XN := {λ ∈ IRN |
∑
i∈N λi = 1}. For λ ∈ X
N we deﬁne
fλi (v) = λiv(N) for all i ∈ N. (5.16)
Theorem 3 A solution f :GN → IRN satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and linearity
if and only if there exists a vector of weights λ ∈ XN such that f = fλ.
Proof
It is easy to verify that fλ, λ ∈ XN , satisﬁes the three properties. To show uniqueness,
assume that solution f :GN → IRN satisﬁes the three properties. We ﬁrst prove uniqueness
for unanimity games uT , ∅ = T ⊆ N . We do this by induction on |T |. If |T | = n, i.e.
T = N , then eﬃciency implies that there exists a vector λ ∈ XN such that f(uN) = λ =
fλ(uN ).
Proceeding by induction, suppose that f(uT ′) = λ for all T
′ ⊆ N with |T ′| > |T |. Take a
speciﬁc j ∈ T and h ∈ N \ T . Since (uT )ij = uT∪{i} when i ∈ N \ T , collusion neutrality
implies that
fi(uT ) + fj(uT ) = fi(uT∪{i}) + fj(uT∪{i}) for all i ∈ N \ T (5.17)
and since (uT )hg = uT∪{h} when g ∈ T \ {j}, collusion neutrality also implies that
fh(uT ) + fg(uT ) = fh(uT∪{h}) + fg(uT∪{h}) for all g ∈ T \ {j}. (5.18)
6One also obtains the impossibility by showing directly that the system of six equations (4.10), (4.11)
and (4.12) together with the four efficiency equalities fi(uT ) + fj(uT ) + fh(uT ) = fi(u{i,j}) + fj(u{i,j}) =
fi(u{i,h}) + fh(u{i,h}) = fj(u{j,h}) + fh(u{j,h}) = 1 has no solution.
7Although we use linearity, this theorem also can be stated by using the weaker additivity axiom.
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With the induction hypothesis the above two equations yield
fi(uT ) + fj(uT ) = λi + λj for all i ∈ N \ T (5.19)
and
fh(uT ) + fg(uT ) = λh + λg for all g ∈ T \ {j}. (5.20)
Then∑
i∈N
fi(uT ) =
∑
g∈T\{j}
fg(uT ) + fj(uT ) +
∑
i∈N\(T∪{h})
fi(uT ) + fh(uT )
=
∑
g∈T\{j}
(λh + λg − fh(uT )) + fj(uT ) +
∑
i∈N\(T∪{h})
(λi + λj − fj(uT )) + fh(uT )
=
∑
g∈T\{j}
λg + (|T | − 1)(λh − fh(uT )) + fj(uT )
+
∑
i∈N\(T∪{h})
λi + (n− |T | − 1)(λj − fj(uT )) + fh(uT )
=
∑
i∈N
λi + (|T | − 2)(λh − fh(uT )) + (n− |T | − 2)(λj − fj(uT )),
where the second equality follows from (5.19) and (5.20). With eﬃciency it follows that∑
i∈N fi(uT ) = 1 =
∑
i∈N λi, and thus
(|T | − 2)(λh − fh(uT )) + (n− |T | − 2)(λj − fj(uT )) = 0. (5.21)
For j ∈ T and h ∈ N \ T , (5.19) yields that
fj(uT ) + fh(uT ) = λj + λh. (5.22)
Solving (5.21) and (5.22) yields fj(uT ) = λj, fh(uT ) = λh, and with (5.19) and (5.20) this
yields that fi(uT ) = λi for all i ∈ N .
Since every game v ∈ GN can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games
v =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
∆v(T )uT , with ∆v(T ) =
∑
S⊆T (−1)
|T |−|S|v(S) being the Harsanyi dividends,
uniqueness for arbitrary v ∈ GN then follows since linearity of f implies that fi(v) =
fi(
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
∆v(T )uT ) =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
∆v(T )fi(uT ) =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
λi∆v(T ) = λi
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
∆v(T ) = λiv(N)
for all i ∈ N . 
Note that as a corollary it follows that adding symmetry to the axioms of Theorem 3 yields
that all weights λi should be equal, and thus characterizes the equal division solution.
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However, these axioms are not logically independent. In Section 3 we showed that for this
characterization linearity is not necessary since it is suﬃcient to require eﬃciency, collusion
neutrality and symmetry.
Also note the diﬀerence between the solutions characterized in this section for TU-
games and the (unique) proportional solution for bankruptcy problems. In that solution
the total estate is distributed proportionally to the claims of the agents, while in the pro-
portional solutions deﬁned by (5.16) for TU-games, the weights that are used are exogenous
and need not be related to the game.
Logical independence of the axioms of Theorem 3 is shown by the following solu-
tions.
1. The Shapley value satisﬁes eﬃciency and linearity. It does not satisfy collusion
neutrality.
2. The Banzhaf value satisﬁes collusion neutrality and linearity. It does not satisfy
eﬃciency.
3. The solution f̂ :GN → IRN given by f̂(v) = f(v) if v(N) ≤ 10 and f̂(v) = ED(v) if
v(N) > 10, with f as given at the end of Section 3, satisﬁes eﬃciency and collusion
neutrality. It does not satisfy linearity.
A ﬁnal question we consider is what solutions satisfy eﬃciency and collusion neutrality. The
answer is that these are kind of proportional solutions, but the weights λ that determine
what share in the worth of the grand coalition the players get depends on the worth of the
grand coalition.
Theorem 4 A solution f satisfies efficiency and collusion neutrality if and only if there
is a function L: IR→ XN such that f = fL(v(N)).
So, in two games v, w ∈ GN with v(N) = w(N) the payoﬀ distributions are the same. The
proof of this theorem goes along similar lines as the proof of Theorem 1 and is therefore
omitted.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the possibilities of having solutions for TU-games that
satisfy eﬃciency and collusion neutrality. We have seen that for games with at least
three players, additionally requiring the symmetry property characterizes the equal division
solution. So, the equal division solution is the unique symmetric solution that satisﬁes
these two properties (that distinguish the Shapley value and Banzhaf value from each
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other). Additionally requiring the null player property instead of symmetry yields an
impossibility. In both results linearity of the solution is not necessary. Other relations
between the Shapley value and equal division solution are given in van den Brink (2007).
Finally, we showed that a solution satisﬁes eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and linearity if
and only if there exist exogenous weights for the players such that in any game the worth
of the ‘grand coalition’ is distributed proportional to these weights. We summarize these
results in Table 1.
Properties/Solutions Sh Ba ED fλ, λ ∈ XN Impossibility
Eﬃciency x x x x
Collusion neutrality x x x x
Symmetry x x x
Null player property x x x
Linearity x x x
Table 1: Characterizing properties of solutions
We remark that collusion neutrality can be replaced by other (but similar) axioms
that reﬂect collusion between two players going to ‘act’ as one, see also Footnote 4.
Note that the multiplicative normalization of the Banzhaf value (i.e. dividing the
worth of the ‘grand coalition’ proportional to the Banzhaf values of the players) as axiom-
atized in van den Brink and van der Laan (1998) does not satisfy collusion neutrality nor
linearity, while the additive normalization of the Banzhaf value (i.e. adding or subtract-
ing from the Banzhaf value of every player the same amount to obtain an eﬃcient payoﬀ
vector) as considered in Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo (1998) does not satisfy collusion
neutrality nor the null player property.
In the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 we needed the player set to contain at least
three players. For two-player games there are more solutions satisfying eﬃciency, collusion
neutrality and symmetry (and linearity). An example is the Shapley value which on the
class of one- and two-player games is equal to the Banzhaf value. Moreover, for two player
games there exist solutions satisfying eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and the null player
property (and linearity), which is again illustrated by the Shapley value.
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